Talmud Bavli
Talmud Bavli

Responsa for Bava Metzia 163:10

לימא דרב יוסף תנאי היא לא בשומר אבידה דכולי עלמא אית להו דרב יוסף והכא

Hence it follows that the creditor acquires a title to the pledge.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' R. Eliezer disagrees. R. Akiba agrees with this. ');"><sup>10</sup></span> But is this reasonable? Verily, R. Isaac's dictum refers to a pledge, not taken when the loan was made;<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. infra 113a, where the verse is interpreted as relating to such a case; the pledge then is obviously a surety for the money. ');"><sup>11</sup></span> but did he say it with reference to a pledge taken at the time of the loan? — Hence where the pledge was not taken when the loan was made, all agree with R. Isaac. But here the reference is to a pledge taken at the time of the loan, and they differ as to the guardian of lost property. For it has been stated: He who is in charge of lost property — Rabbah said: He ranks as an unpaid bailee; R. Joseph maintained: As a paid bailee.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. supra 29a. R. Akiba, reasoning on the same lines as R. Joseph, regards the creditor as a paid bailee, since it is a positive duty to assist a fellow-man with a loan (cf. Lev. XXV, 35), whilst R. Eliezer regards him as an unpaid bailee. ');"><sup>12</sup></span> Shall we say that R. Joseph's view is disputed by Tannaim? — No. With respect to one who guards lost property, all agree with R. Joseph. But here

Teshuvot Maharam

Q. It is the law that the responsibility of a creditor toward a pledge he received as security for a loan is that of a paid bailee. Does this responsibility also extend to the amount by which the pledge exceeds the loan?
A. Since Ri ruled that the opinion of Rabba prevails, that the responsibility of a keeper of a lost object is that of a gratuitous bailee (B. M. 82a), the responsibility of the creditor toward the excess value of the pledge is also that of a gratuitous bailee. Although some authorities are of the opposite opinion, the very fact that a difference of opinion exists creates a doubt as to the law; and in case of doubt we do not render a verdict to collect.
SOURCES: Am II, 161; Mord. Sheb. 774; Tesh. Maim. to Mishpatim, 56; Agudah Sheb. 36; cf. Pr. 185; ibid. 699b.
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